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Abstract 
China has experienced tremendous growth in its exports to the world since the 1990’s. Its 
exports to the world rose from just 2 percent of the world’s share to close to 13 percent from 
1990 to 2017. Its exports to the United States increased even more during the same period, 
from 3 percent to 33 percent. China’s WTO accession, awarding China permanent most 
favored nation (MFN) status, led to this dramatically increase in exports through a reduction 
in the US trade policy uncertainty (TPU). This report first reviews the sources of gains from 
trade and the gravity equation to estimate trade flow between countries. Second, this report 
illustrates why optimal tariffs are not zero and the effects of tariffs on trade volumes and 
import prices. TPU arises when countries have the power to increase tariffs. This report 
reviews the recent literature on the effects of reducing TPU on export growth, export prices, 
and product varieties. Handley and Limão (2017a) find that over one third of the export 
growth from China to U.S. after China’s accession to the WTO is accounted by the reduction 
in TPU between China and US.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
Over the past 30 years, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have increased 
global trade flows by a factor of five. Currently, there are 164 WTO memberships, representing 
more than 98% of international trade (WITS). After China acquired the permanent most 
favored nation (MFN) status from its WTO accession in 2001, its exports to the United States 
dramatically increased through a reduction in US trade policy uncertainty (TPU).  
Figure 1.1, obtained from Handley and Limão (2017a), shows that the boom in exports 
from China to U.S. occurs after China’s accession to the WTO. Some scholars argue that 
China’s accession to WTO lowered Chinese exporters’ trade costs but the actual US-applied 
tariffs toward China at the time remained unchanged. Although the applied tariffs remained at 
the MFN tariff level since China obtained temporary MFN status in 1980, in the 1990s, U.S. 
Congress had the right to revoke China’s temporary MFN status every year. The annual U.S. 
threat to impose higher tariffs led to a great deal of uncertainties for Chinese exports to the U.S. 
in the 1990s. The U.S. threats to withdraw China’s temporary MFN status, (or Normal Trade 
Relations, NTR), remained real during the 1990s. Pierce and Schott (2016) create a China NTR 
uncertainty index, as shown in Figure 1.2, that displays the percent of articles from New York 







Figure 1.1. Chinese Import Penetration in the United States1 
 Source: Handley and Limão (2017a) Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.2 China MFN (or NTR) Uncertainty Index.  
 
Source: Figure 1 in Pierce and Schott (2017).  
                                                   
1 Import penetration ratios: are defined here as the ratio between the value of imports as a 
percentage of total consumption. 
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In October 2000, U.S. granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) which 
became effective after China’s accession to the WTO at the end of 2001. This eliminated 
Congress’ right to revoke China’s MFN status, and thus reduced TPU between U.S. and China.     
However, in recent years, there are tremendous changes in U.S. trade policies after Donald 
Trump’s election. President Trump already implemented higher tariffs on a diverse range of 
goods that are imported from China and is planning to increase tariffs on a broader range of 
Chinese goods unless an agreement is made between the U.S. and China. As a result, trade 
policy uncertainties between China and U.S. are beginning to rise. Nicita et al. (2018) claim 
that signs of a trade war start to appear. To understand what increasing TPU would mean to 
firms and workers in U.S. and China today, it is important to first assess the effects of reducing 
TPU that took place in 2000/2001.   
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. First, in chapter two, this report 
reviews the sources of gains from trade and the structural gravity model to estimate trade flows 
between countries. Second, given there are gains from trade, chapter two of this report reviews 
a simple model that illustrates why optimal tariffs are not zero. The model suggests that the 
optimal tariffs are inversely related to the elasticity of the foreign export supply. The more 
inelastic the foreign export supply is, the higher is the tariff in the home country. Next, to 
understand the vital role of tariff as a trade policy instrument, this report assesses the effects of 
tariffs on various outcomes using a simple demand and supply model. Given that importing 
countries can change their tariffs, exporting countries face trade policy uncertainties. This 
report reviews the different measures of trade policy uncertainties and focuses on the tariff 
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uncertainty used in Handley and Limão (2017a). In chapter 4, this report reviews the effects of 
reducing trade policy uncertainty (TPU) in the recent literature. In particular, this report first 
describes the structural model proposed by Handley and Limão (2017a) that leads to a TPU-
augmented gravity equation to explain the effects of reducing the importing country’s TPU on 
the foreign country’s export growth. In the year 2000, U.S. granted China permanent normal 
trade relations tariff rates (PNTR) which reduced TPU for China’s exports to US. This report 
reviews the empirical works that study the effects of reducing TPU on China’s exports and the 
effects on various outcome variables in the U.S. Chapter five concludes.  
Chapter 2 Gains from Trade and Trade Flows 
 In a neoclassical trade model with standard assumptions of perfect competition, constant 
returns to scale and no distortions, comparative advantage is the reason for trade. Chapter 2 
reviews the neoclassical trade models including the Ricardian model that assumes 
technological differences as sources of comparative advantage, the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
that assumes factor endowment differences as sources of comparative advantages, and 
increasing returns to scale production technology. I review the theoretical foundation for the 
structural gravity model that will become useful when I discuss the structural model in Handley 
and Limão (2017a) to incorporate TPU in their TPU-augmented gravity model.  
2.1 Comparative Advantage and Trade in a One-Factor World 
The theory of comparative advantage is one essential part of explaining welfare gains 
from international trade. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith demonstrates that a country should 
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specialize in its production and conduct trade exchange according to its comparative advantage 
and absolute advantage. During the process of this production, different countries can make 
full use of their different resources and maximize social welfare. That is, a country should trade 
for goods or services at lower opportunity costs from another country and make the products 
at lower opportunity cost at home.  
It is best to illustrate the theory of comparative advantage in a one-factor economy using 
the following example. Suppose, there are two countries, called Home and Foreign respectively.  
Each country only has 1000 hours of labor in producing two goods, wine and butter. Table 
2.1 indicates that Home country can produce a unit of wine with 4 hours of labor and one unit 
of butter with 8 hours of labor; Foreign country produces one unit of wine requiring 15 hours 
of labor, and one unit of butter requires 10 hours of labor. 
Table 2.1 Unit Labor Requirements for Home country and Foreign country 
 Wine  Butter 
Home country 4 8 
Foreign country 15 10 
 
In the absence of international trade, if each country produces both goods, relative prices 
must adjust as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻⁄ = 𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻 𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻⁄                           (2.11) 
𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹⁄ = 𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹⁄  
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where 𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻  is labor requirements of producing a unit of wine, 𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻 is labor requirements of 
producing a unit of butter, 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻⁄  is the relative price in Home country. 𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 , 𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹  are labor 
requirements of producing wine and butter in Foreign country. Thus, we have relative price 
𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻⁄ = 1 2⁄ , 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹⁄ = 1.5. The opportunity cost of wine in the Home country is much 
smaller than the Foreign country. Production for both goods in both countries shown in Figure 
2.1. 
In international trade, although the Home country has an absolute advantage in both 
productions, the Foreign country still has a comparative advantage in producing butter, the 
Home country has a comparative advantage in producing wine. We can value the relative price 
between relative prices in these countries, say 1.  








Figure 2.1 Production Probabilities Frontier 
Source: Krugman et al. 2015, p34 
Notes: Thick lines are production probabilities with a trade. 
Thin lines are production probabilities without trade. 
250 
100 
Foreign Home  
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of butter, instead of the 125 units it could produce itself. Similarly, the Foreign country only 
produces butter with a trade. Figure 2.1 indicates the expansions of production probabilities 
due to the trade. Therefore, each country is better off in trade. 
2.2 Heckscher-Ohlin Factor Endowment Theory 
Factor Endowment Theory is another important theory. The reason we choose to import 
cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo rather than from other countries is that 
Congo’s factor endowment in cobalt is abundant, and therefore the price of cobalt is relatively 
cheap. Factor Endowment Theory suggests that a country exports products of its abundant 
resources and imports products of scarce resources. Trade between China and the US is a sound 
example to demonstrate the theory. Due to the high cost of labor in the U.S., U.S. has to import 
a large number of labor-intensive products from China. This is because compared to China's 
labor endowment, U.S. labor endowment is quite limited and scarce. However, the U.S. has 
sufficient capital to produce capital-intensive products. Therefore, China exports labor-
intensive products to the US and imports capital-intensive products from the US.  
2.3 Economies of Scale 
Relaxing the assumption on the constant returns to scale production technology allows us 
to study the implications of economies of scale. When one firm has an increasing returns to 
scale production technology, average cost is decreasing with as the firm expands its production 
when it exports to the foreign market.  
We can use the following example to illustrate why the economy of scale provides an 
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incentive for international trade. Suppose, consumer preferences, production technology, 
factors and any other relevant conditions for production are exactly same in country K and J. 
We use the same production probability frontier and indifference curve for product X and Y in 
both countries. Because both J and K have economies of scale, producing X and Y has a 
decreasing cost implies for one additional unit of X, the amount of Y you must give up reduces. 
Without trade, both countries can produce X1 units of X and Y1 units of Y at maximized utility 
as Figure 2.2 shown. At this time, the relative domestic prices for X and Y are the same for the 
both countries. However, if country K expands X production to X3 and country J expands Y 
production to Y3, and then they trade with each other, countries get more cost advantages. 
Country K exports 𝑋𝑋3 − 𝑋𝑋2 units of X and imports 𝑌𝑌3 − 𝑌𝑌2 units of Y. Meanwhile, country J 
trade the same amount of these two products. Therefore, we can get (𝑋𝑋2,𝑌𝑌2) for both countries 
which is more beneficial than (𝑋𝑋1,𝑌𝑌1). This example follows that international trade based on 
international division of labor will make more benefits through rising productivity, reducing 
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2.4 Trade in N Countries 
Next, consider extending the two-country two-goods case into N countries, G goods and 
F factors. Samuelson (1939) explains gains from trade in the following model. Consider a 
world economy with 𝑛𝑛 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁𝑁  countries, each country has ℎ = 1,⋯ ,𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛  individuals. 
There are 𝑔𝑔 = 1,⋯ ,𝐺𝐺 goods, in country n. 𝑝𝑝 ≡ (𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛,⋯ ,𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛) is goods price in country n, 
𝑦𝑦 ≡ (𝑦𝑦1𝑛𝑛,⋯ ,𝑦𝑦𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛) is output quantity for good in country n. 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛 maximizes revenue under 
perfect competition: 
𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛(𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛, 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛) = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛                           (2.12) 
In addition, there are 𝑓𝑓 = 1,⋯ ,𝐹𝐹  factors in country n. 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 ≡ (𝑣𝑣1𝑛𝑛,⋯ , 𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛)  denotes 
different kinds of factors and 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 ≡ (𝑤𝑤1𝑛𝑛,⋯ ,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛) denotes the price for factors in country n. 
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛ℎ minimizes expenditure for the household:  
𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛ℎ(𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛ℎ) = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛ℎ                        (2.13) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛ℎ ≡ �𝑐𝑐1𝑛𝑛ℎ,⋯ , 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛ℎ� denotes household consumption and 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛ℎ denotes utility level 
of the household in equilibrium in country n.  
Holding expressions 2.12 and 2.13, we are in a neoclassical trade model, we assume there 
is just one household per country to simplify our analysis. By the definition of expenditure, we 
have:  
𝑒𝑒(𝑝𝑝,𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎                           (2.14) 
By the definition of revenue, we have: 
𝑒𝑒(𝑝𝑝,𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) ≤ 𝑟𝑟(𝑝𝑝, 𝑣𝑣)                        (2.15) 
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By the market clearing under autarky2, we have: 
𝑒𝑒(𝑝𝑝,𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) = 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎                          (2.16) 
By equations 2.12, 2.13, and trade balance, we have: 
𝑒𝑒(𝑝𝑝,𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎) =  𝑒𝑒(𝑝𝑝,𝑢𝑢)                        (2.17) 
Where (𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎)  denote output, consumption, and good prices under autarky, 
(𝑦𝑦, 𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝)  denote output, consumption, and good prices under free trade. Since e(𝑝𝑝,∙)  is 
increasing, we can get 𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 . Inequalities 2.14 and 2.15 correspond to consumption and 
production gains from trade, see Figure 2.3. Even facing a new price vector, households cannot 
be worse by reoptimizing consumption and production. Therefore, the proposition that free 
trade makes all households (slightly) better off in a neoclassical trade model with one 
household per country is confirmed.  
 
Figure 2.3 Gains from trade 
                                                   
2 Autarky: a system or policy of economic self-sufficiency aimed at removing the need for 
imports. 
Source: Costinot and Donaldson 2013  
11 
 
2.5 The Gravity Model in Trade Flows  
2.51 Introduction to the Gravity Model 
Since there are gains from trade, it is important to learn what affects trade flows. The 
gravity model is a successful in predicting trade flows.  





𝛽𝛽4𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                       (2.18) 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is exports from country i to country j, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  are gross domestic 
production(GDP) in country i and j, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the distance between country i and j, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is any 
other factor(s) between i and j, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a log-normally distributed error term with 
𝐸𝐸�𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 0. In this expression, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 influence potential trade scale for countries i and 
j, and the distance becomes a trade barrier due to its impacting the transport cost. 
For the sake of regression, when we transform equation 2.18 into the log-linear version, 
we can get the following: 
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽2 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (2.19) 
where 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, and 𝛽𝛽3 are correlation coefficients and indicate effects on the bilateral trade of 
GDP and distances.  
2.52 Explanatory Variables Adjustment 
Early research using gravity model did not rely on theoretical foundations (Tinbergen 
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1962, Bergstrand 1985, McCallum 1995). The majority of their regression equations are log 
linear, and the regression results can explain the correlation between the explanatory variables 
and trade flows. Isard and Peck (1954) find that flow of trade is greater between countries that 
are located close to one another. Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) find that bilateral trade 
flows are positively associated with economic aggregates but negatively associated with 
distance. The specific expression is: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ �                           (2.20) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total value of bilateral trade, and 𝐴𝐴 is a proportional constant.  
Without a theoretical foundation, scholars added explanatory variables in the gravity 
equation to better explain trade flows. For example, Linnemann (1966) introduces population 
as an additional explanatory variable into the equation. Bergstrand (1989) introduces per capita 
income, exchange rates, and other dummy variables into the gravity equation. Since then, the 
gravity model has commonly included dummy variables, such as whether country i and j have 
the same language, the same border, the same currency, and so on.  
2.53 Border Effect 
McCallum (1995) uses a modified gravity model (2.19) to regress bilateral flows between 
Canada and 30 states in the US in 1988. He finds that trade volume among provinces in Canada 
is 22 times the volume between one Canadian province and one US state while controlling for 
GDP and distance. This is known as the border effect. Border has an adverse impact on trade. 
Grossman (1998) thinks it to be a surprising discovery. A number of studies (McCallum 1995; 
Head and Ries 2001) confirm the existing border effect. However, the border effect is on a 
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declining trend and has different effects for different countries or regions.   
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) derive a structural gravity model based on a theoretical 
foundation of consumers and firms. They argue that the model established by McCallum (1995) 
lacks important explanatory variables: the multilateral resistance variables 3. Omitting the 
multilateral resistance terms would lead to the overestimation of border effect. Moreover, the 
border effect is highly related to economy size. It is lager for small countries. Evans (2003) 
finds that numerous factors cause border effect, for example, tariffs, costs of information or 
trade, substitutions and so on.   
The gravity model derived by Anderson and Wincoop (2003) laid the foundation for the 
TPU-augmented gravity model in Handley and Limão (2017a), for which this report will 
discuss in details in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 Tariffs and Trade Policy Uncertainty 
As explained in the last chapter, there are gains from trade. It follows that countries should 
have little incentive to restrict international trade. However, we do not observe free trade in the 
world. Every country uses trade policies to place restrictions on international trade.  
Therefore, this chapter offers some theoretical foundation on why some countries are 
protectionists. The most common trade policy instrument is the manipulation of tariffs. As 
tariffs change, trade policy uncertainty arises. There are different measures of TPU used in the 
                                                   
3 Multilateral resistance terms: can be one of the most crucial factors to be accounted for to 
avoid the omitted variable bias in the gravity model. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) refer to 
relative price effect as multilateral resistance variables. 
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literature. I will focus my discussion on two measures of TPU. I will discuss the effects of trade 
policy uncertainty in the next chapter. 
3.1 Optimal Tariffs 
In reality, even when free trade is optimal, we cannot find a country that trades without 
any restrictions. Most countries have incentives to impose import tariffs and export subsidies 
or taxes to meet their preferences in terms of trade. There are theories explaining why countries 
want to place positive tariffs.   
Assuming welfare is governments’ one concern, the only motive for trade protection is 
price manipulation. Suppose, there are two countries, 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 in a world economy and two 
goods, 𝑣𝑣 = 1,2, both of which are produced under perfect competition. We use good 2 as the 
numeraire, 𝑝𝑝2𝑤𝑤 = 1 . Country A is a natural importer of good 1, and country B is a natural 
importer of good 2. The number of imports in both countries can be written as follows: 
𝑚𝑚1𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) ≡ 𝑑𝑑1𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) − 𝑦𝑦1𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴)                  (3.11) 
𝑚𝑚2𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) ≡ 𝑑𝑑2𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) − 𝑦𝑦2𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵)                  (3.12) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 ≡ 𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝2𝑐𝑐⁄  is the relative price in country c, 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 ≡ 𝑝𝑝1𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝2𝑤𝑤⁄  is world relative price, 
𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) is demand for good v in country c, 𝑦𝑦𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐) is the supply of good v in country c.  
The exports in country c also can be written as: 
𝑥𝑥2𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) ≡ 𝑦𝑦2𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴) − 𝑑𝑑2𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)                (3.13) 
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𝑥𝑥1𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) ≡ 𝑦𝑦1𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵) − 𝑑𝑑1𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)                (3.14) 
Because of the premise of natural imports and exports, it is reasonable that good 1 imports 
of country A are equal to the demand for good 1 less supply, which leads to a shortage without 
trade, and equation 3.11 is positive. In terms of exports, the amount of exports of good 2 in 
country A, is supply for the good 2 minus the demand. There will be a surplus if the country 
does not trade, so equation 3.13 is positive. Since country B has symmetric conditions, 
equations 3.12 and 3.14 are positive as well. 
If these countries trade and the market clearing for good 2 requires imports of good 2 in 
country B must be the same as the exports of good 2 in country A: 
𝑥𝑥2𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) = 𝑚𝑚2𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)                          (3.15) 
Imposing an ad-valorem tariff 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 creates a wedge between the world and local prices: 
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴)𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤                                (3.16) 
𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵)⁄                                (3.17) 
Equations 3.15-3.17 define relative prices of country c are determined by world relative 
prices and tariffs in country c, while world relative prices are related to the tariffs in both 




𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐) ≡ 𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐[𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐) + 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)]               (3.18) 
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where 𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐) = 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥
𝑦𝑦
{𝑝𝑝1𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑝𝑝2𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦2|𝑦𝑦 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒} is revenue for sum of two goods in country 
c,  𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) = (𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 − 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)𝑚𝑚1𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤)  if 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴 ; 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐(𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) = (𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 1⁄ )𝑚𝑚1𝐵𝐵(𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵,𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤) 
if 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐵𝐵. Solving the maximum utility function, we obtain optimal tariffs should be inverse of 
the elasticity of foreign export supply: 
𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴 = 1 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵⁄                              (3.19) 
𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵 = 1 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴⁄                              (3.20) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 is the elasticity of export supply of country c. It is true that import tariffs are 
intimately related to countries' market power4. If countries have enough market power to be 
able to improve their terms-of-trade, there is an incentive to impose strictly positive tariffs.  
 Therefore, we conclude that countries with market power are willing to impose import 
tariffs. Optimal tariffs are inversely associated with the elasticity of foreign export supply. In 
other words, if the elasticity of foreign export supply is small, then governments will have 
higher incentive to set high tariffs. If the elasticity of foreign export supply is large, then 
governments will have lower incentive to set high tariffs. 
3.2 Effects of Tariffs  
The goal of trade policies for a country is to manipulate prices and protect its trade. A 
country uses import tariffs to protect domestic industries from competition from imports 
through raising the imported goods’ price, thus reducing the demand for imported goods. A 
                                                   
4 Market power: ability for the importing country to knock down the world price after applying 
a tariff.  
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country may also impose export subsidies to encourage export industries. The potential for 
tariffs to change is the primary source of trade policy uncertainty. But first, we need to 
understand the effect of changes in applied tariffs.  
Tariffs are taxes levied when a good is imported. They have been used as the most 
important trade policy instrument by many governments for the following reasons. First, 
governments impose tariffs to raise government revenue. Second, tariffs are often used to 
protect domestic industries, especially infant or uncompetitive domestic firms, by discouraging 
imports. Nonetheless, tariffs have different effects on different countries.  
When a small country imposes a tariff, it cannot affect world prices and bring down the 
foreign price of the imported good. As Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows, before trade, the small 
country has a shortage amount of 𝐷𝐷1 − 𝑆𝑆1 units for the good so the country has a desire to 
import the shortage amount of the good. If it imports in free trade, 𝐷𝐷1 − 𝑆𝑆1 amount of the 
good needs to be imported. If the country imposes a tariff, because it is too small to affect the 
world price 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊, the price of the imports will increase by the percentage of tariff rates 𝜏𝜏, to 
(1 + 𝜏𝜏)𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊. 
The country will have new quantities for demand and supply because of the increased 
price, and the shortage of good lowers to the amount of 𝐷𝐷2 − 𝑆𝑆2. An increase in price leads to 
a loss of consumer surplus, exhibited by 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑑𝑑 area. Meanwhile, producer surplus 
increases by area 𝑎𝑎, and the government gets the (𝐷𝐷2 − 𝑆𝑆2) × 𝜏𝜏 amount of revenue exhibited 
by the 𝑐𝑐 area. Therefore, an increased price causes deadweight loss in the country, given by 
the area 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑑𝑑 . We can see from a small-country case that surplus is transferred from 
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consumers to producers and the government if a tariff is levied on the good. Moreover, 
consumers lose more than producers and the government, so that brings out deadweight loss. 
Nonetheless, the small-country case is not the whole story when it comes to studying the 
effects of a tariff. We must also analyze what happens to large countries. The following is an 
example. Suppose there are two large countries A and B, country A imports from country B 
within a single market. If these two countries are in free trade equilibrium, the world price is 
such that country B is willing to export the same quantity that country A is willing to import. 
However, if the price in country B would remain the same after imposing a tariff, country B 
would be willing to export more than country A would be willing to import. Thus, country B 
must decrease the price to reach the equilibrium. As Panel B of Figure 3.1 shows, in country 
A, loss of consumer surplus is the area of 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑔𝑔 + ℎ; the increase of producer surplus is 
𝑒𝑒; government revenue is 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑗𝑗. Thus, we can compute gains for country A that is 𝑗𝑗 − 𝑓𝑓 − ℎ. 
Furtherly, country A would gain from the imposition of the tariff if 𝑗𝑗 is bigger than the 
deadweight loss, the sum of 𝑓𝑓 and ℎ. Other trade policy instruments include non-tariff trade 
barriers such as quota and the rule of origin. This report, however, focuses on the effects of 
tariffs and TPU in tariffs. The next subsection of this report discusses the evolution of trade 
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3.3 Evolution of Trade Policy Uncertainty  
In practice, the profitability of exporting enterprises is easily affected by changes in the 
international trade policy environment, which is mainly reflected by the frequent adjustment 
of tariffs on imported products by foreign governments. To understand why and how export is 
affected by trade policy, it is better to understand the history of TPU and the measurement of 
TPU.  
Bernanke (1983) divides uncertainty in investment information into two types, known and 
unknown until investment. The latter is usually a source of risk, and we cannot avoid it. Knight 
(1921) argues that there is a third type of information, that firms have to wait and see to obtain. 
It is also the source of uncertainty and firms avoid it through delaying investment. Furthermore, 
Dixit (1989) proposes that firms must pay entry costs to enter the market. Roberts and Tybout 
(1997) show the existence of entry costs and the irreversibility of these costs. The uncertainty 
in the environment leads to uncertain firm profits. Firms only choose to invest if the expected 
profit is more than the sunk cost.   
At the beginning of the uncertainty analysis, the literature was mostly concerned with 
analyzing the effects of economic policy uncertainty. For example, Baldwin and Krugman 
(1989) analyze the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on firms’ entry and exit. Handley (2014) 
is one of the first to discuss the effect of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) on firms’ export 
decisions. Since then, there has been an emerging literature on the effects of TPU. Similar to 
economic policy uncertainty, TPU delays firms’ investment and affects firms’ exports (Limão 
and Maggi, 2015). In addition, Carballo et al. (2018) combine economic policy uncertainty 
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(EPU) and trade policy uncertainty to study their effects on economic recovery. They find that 
both EPU and TPU restricted world export growth after the 2008 crisis but a reduction of TPU 
because of a preferential trade agreement reduced the adverse effects of EPU. 
3.4 Measures of Trade Policy Uncertainty 
In order to study the effects of TPU, a sound measure of TPU must be developed. 
Sudsawasd and Moore (2006) use five trade policy indicators to measure the overall trade 
policy because of the absence of a consensus on which method is the best. The five indicators 
are average import tariffs, trade shares, average duties, tax ratios, and the Dollar Index. 
However, more economists now measure TPU using uncertainty in tariffs after Handley (2014).  
3.41 Index of Trade Policy Uncertainty  
Baker et al. (2016) conduct an economic policy uncertainty index according to the 
frequency of appearance of related news. Handley and Limão (2017b) apply this methodology 
to get an index of trade policy uncertainty. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the number of news stories that 
mention ‘trade,’ ‘policy’ or ‘uncertainty’ for newspaper i in month t, 𝑇𝑇1 denotes the time 
intervals used in the standardization calculations, 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 denotes time-series variance. Remove 
the abnormal data and standardize 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 through standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 in 𝑇𝑇1 time intervals, to 
get standardized TPU frequency 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2⁄   and average 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  in time t 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . 
Furthermore, use 𝑇𝑇2 to calculate the normalized time intervals in order to get average 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 in 
𝑇𝑇2 time intervals 𝑀𝑀 = ?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖. The objective of this step is to restrict the frequency to a certain 
range to avoid the results in different levels. Lastly, we can get trade policy uncertainty based 
on news, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ∙
100
𝑀𝑀
. This measurement provides extensive coverage for TPU because it 
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can measure other aspects of policy uncertainty by changing the keywords, for example, 
economic policy uncertainty. Moreover, the uncertainty index is highly compatible with macro 
fluctuations (Baker et al. 2016). Additionally, Handley and Limão (2017b) use this approach 
to measure the variation tendency of TPU of the United States and find that the TPU index rises 
dramatically after Trump’ nomination (Figure 3.2).  
Despite the fact that the index of TPU can be used for many other fields, there still are 
drawbacks. First, subjective options for keywords may lead to slant. Second, we have to check 
many times, which causes a heavy workload. Third, it is normal that newspapers and news 
websites publish an article many times. If we do not delete duplicate samples, the index would 
be overestimated. Four, it is one-sided because of the absence of tariffs. It is usually applied 
when researching the changes in TPU due to the shocks in economics and politics.  
Figure 3.2 US Trade Policy Uncertainty News Index 2007-
Source: Handley and Limão (2017b) Figure 1. 
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3.42 Tariff Measurement 
Compared to the TPU index based on news stories, the measure based on tariff uncertainty 
is easier to obtain. Usually, research papers focus on changes in one country’s TPU from its 
accesses to multilateral trade organizations or changes in two countries’ TPU from signing a 
bilateral free trade agreements. Handley and Limão (2017a) derive a measuring method by 
theoretical models. 
Handley and Limão (2017a) explain that even though China obtained temporary most 
favored nation status in 1980 with the U.S., China had always faced the threat of losing MFN 
status with the U.S. until its WTO accession. China’s accession to WTO ended the threat of 
U.S. reverting to Smoot-Hawley Tariffs, and the TPU for Chinese export firms reduced 
gradually. Handley and Limão (2017a) use tariff rates of column 25 in 2000 and MFN tariffs to 




 , where 𝜎𝜎 is the constant elasticity of substitution, 𝜏𝜏1 is applied 
(MFN) tariff, 𝜏𝜏2 is the worst-case (column 2) tariff.  
Pierce and Schott and Feng et al. (2017) use a reduced-form equation to measure TPU. 
They directly calculate the reduction in uncertainty using the gap between the worst-case tariff 
and the applied tariff. That is, 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈 = 𝜏𝜏2 − 𝜏𝜏1.  A positive TPU value implies that a large 
amount of uncertainty is reduced after China’s WTO accession.  
Limão (2016) explain that there are three primary sources of TPU. The first is tariff 
volatility. The volatility of trade policy is still important even after signing bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements. The second source is shocks from the international environment. 
                                                   
5 Tariff rates of column 2 are the rates for countries that are denied NTR (MFN) treatment. 
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For example, Present Trump’s policies cause an increase in uncertainty in the world. The third 
source is domestic policies. For example, Brexit in 2016 led to rising in policy uncertainty in 
England, including trade policy.  The next chapter discusses the model developed by Handley 
and Limão (2017a) that incorporates TPU and generates predictions about export growth in 
details.  
Chapter 4 Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
In this chapter, I review the TPU-augmented gravity model proposed by Handley and 
Limao (2017a). Moreover, I provide empirical evidence from China’s WTO accession to study 
the effects of reducing the TPU in US on the China’s export growth. 
4.1 Theoretical Analysis 
4.11 Consumer Preference and Firms 
Handley and Limão (2017a) develop a theoretical model that allows firms to take trade 
policy uncertainty into account when making decisions to export. Handley and Limão (2017a) 
build on Melitz’s (2003) model to allow heterogeneous firms with different costs 
(productivities). Consumer preferences for differentiated goods 𝑣𝑣  follow a CES utility 
function: 




𝜎𝜎−1                        (4.11) 
where 𝑈𝑈 is the utility level, 𝜎𝜎 > 1  is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES), 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜑𝜑) is 
the quantity demanded for product 𝑣𝑣.  
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On the production side, firms are heterogeneous in their costs. For a single-product 
enterprise, firm’s entry and exit are reflected in the product’s entry and exit. Handley and 
Limão assume that the firm observes the economic conditions state s, denoted by as, and 
decides to export or not depending on its expected profits and the sunk cost of exporting, 
denoted by K. If the expected profit is larger than the sunk cost, the firm will enter the foreign 
markets and continues to export with probability 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1 in the following period. For 
every firm, profit is determined by the market conditions, as and its cost 𝒸𝒸. Therefore, based 
on the CES utility function and the price index, the expected value of any firm from exporting 
is  
∏ (𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 , 𝑐𝑐) = 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 + 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 ℯ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠′  𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎∞𝑖𝑖=1                     (4.12) 
where 𝑐𝑐 is the heterogeneous firm cost, 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 is the expectation for future state conditions based 
on the current conditions, and 𝛽𝛽 is the probability of staying in the market.  
The conditions in the domestic market are assumed to be deterministic because firms do 
not face tariffs in their home market. As a result, firms will serve the domestic market if their 
costs are below the deterministic cutoff, 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠,ℎ𝐷𝐷 . If a firm is certain about future conditions and 
does not expect the tariff to change in the foreign market, the firm will enter the export market 
when its cost is lower than threshold for exporting under the deterministic environment, 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷. If 





Figure 4.1 A Firm’s Preferences    
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now and incur the sunk cost of entry or wait for a lower tariff in the future to enter. Figure 4.1 
indicates a firm’s preferences under different scenarios. Depending on what the current applied 
tariff is, denoted by 𝜏𝜏1, and the maximum level the tariff could increase to, denoted by 𝜏𝜏2, the 
cost cutoff under uncertainty is shifted to the left. The greater the uncertainty, the further the 
cutoff for exporting will move to the left. 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈1  is exporting cutoff under the case with 
uncertainty when the applied tariff is 𝜏𝜏1. As shown in Figure 4.1, 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈1 < 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷, therefore firms 
with costs between 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈1 and 𝒸𝒸𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷 are no longer able to export under the uncertainty case. By 
reducing uncertainty, these firms will begin to export. Uncertainty is larger when the 
probability of shifting to 𝜏𝜏2 is larger. When uncertainty is larger, the cost cutoff for exporting 
is further shifted to the left.  Based on the model, it follows then that only in industries with 
large sunk costs we would expect trade uncertainty to affect trade flows and the number of 
variety of goods produced. In low sunk costs industries, we would expect that reducing 
uncertainty has no effect.  
4.12 Trade Policy  
In order to estimate the effect of trade policy uncertainty, Handley and Limão (2017a) 
classify states into three different trade policies, denoted by 𝓂𝓂 = 0,1,2, corresponding to the 
three types of tariffs, 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏1 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 , where 𝜏𝜏0 is the low protection tariff, 𝜏𝜏2 is the high 
protection tariff, and 𝜏𝜏1 denotes a temporary tariff in the intermediate state, which changes 
with probability 𝛾𝛾. For example, we can consider China's pre -WTO period as the intermediate 
state because the United States could change China’s MFN status every year with probability 




4.13 Partial Equilibrium  
Handley and Limão (2017a) first look at a small country, so its change in exports has no 
effect on the importer’s aggregate variables. The relationship between the cost cutoff in the 
intermediate state and any deterministic baseline state with tariff 𝜏𝜏𝑏𝑏 satisfies: 
 𝑐𝑐1𝑈𝑈 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷⁄  =  𝑈𝑈(𝜔𝜔, 𝛾𝛾)  ×  (𝜏𝜏1 𝜏𝜏𝑏𝑏⁄ )
−𝜎𝜎
1−𝜎𝜎                   (4.13) 
where 𝜔𝜔 is the ratio of operating profits under the 𝜏𝜏2 relative to 𝜏𝜏1 , 𝑐𝑐1𝑈𝑈 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷⁄  reflects the 
influences of trade policy changes on costs of exporting firm’s entry,  (𝜏𝜏1 𝜏𝜏𝑏𝑏⁄ )
−𝜎𝜎
1−𝜎𝜎 reflects the 
effects of tariff changes, 𝑈𝑈(𝜔𝜔, 𝛾𝛾) reflects the impact of trade policy uncertainty, entry is 
decreased if 𝑈𝑈 is smaller than 1. One thing needs to be noted, an increase in 𝛾𝛾 is interpreted 
as the probability of a change in trade policy is higher, but we cannot distinguish if the change 
is to the low protection state with probability 𝜆𝜆1 or to the high protection state with probability 
𝜆𝜆2.  
4.2 The TPU-Augmented Gravity Equation 
China's WTO accession brings not only more exporters thanks to the reduced trade policy 
uncertainty but also more investment from incumbent exporters. For instance, existing 
exporters are willing to pay more to upgrade technology conditions under less uncertainty. 
Because export growth reflects both extensive and intensive margin effects, Handley and 
Limão (2017a) derive a TPU-augmented gravity equation to estimate the effects of changes in 
trade policy uncertainty on export growth. In order to set the model as time-invariant, they use 
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the Markov process and define the set of firms in industry V, with a similar productivity 
distribution 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉. 
As mentioned before, the gravity model is an important model for studying factors that 
influence international trade; it is widely used due to its solid theoretical basis. According to 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003), the gravity model should add multilateral-resistance factors. 
Otherwise, there would be bias. Following Anderson and Wincoop (2003), Handley and Limão 
(2017a) add two items, policy uncertainty, and technology upgrade condition, into the gravity 
equation to estimate these two factors' impact. Thus, the TPU-augmented gravity equation 
stands thus: 
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉  =  (𝑘𝑘 − 𝜎𝜎 + 1) 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 −
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎−1
𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 − 𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 + 𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃 +
𝑘𝑘
𝜎𝜎−1
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝐸𝐸 +  𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝜁𝜁𝑉𝑉 +
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝛼𝛼�𝑉𝑉                                                            (4.14)                                  
where 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 is export revenue of industry 𝑉𝑉, 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 denotes policy uncertainty, 𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 denotes the 
tariff level of industry 𝑉𝑉 in state s, 𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉 denotes distance, 𝑃𝑃 denotes price index, 𝐸𝐸 denotes 
aggregate expenditure, 𝜁𝜁𝑉𝑉  denotes upgrade conditions. From 4.14 expression, 𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉 = 1 
implies there is no policy uncertainty, analogous to a technology upgrade, 𝜁𝜁𝑉𝑉= = 1 implies 
there is no upgrading so that 4.14 expression is reduced to the standard industry-level gravity 
equation on tariffs, distance, price index, and aggregate expenditure. To estimate the difference 
between pre-WTO and post-WTO, they also derive a time-difference equation, 
∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 =  𝑓𝑓(
𝜏𝜏2𝑉𝑉
𝜏𝜏1𝑉𝑉
, 𝛾𝛾)  + 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝜏𝜏𝑣𝑣 +  𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑∆ 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣 + 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉             (4.15) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏 < 0 is the coefficient of applied tariffs, 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 is the distance coefficient, 𝑓𝑓 is any 
changes in expenditure or price index. Ceteris paribus, the equation predicts that if there was a 
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probability of increase in tariffs or distance costs, the export growth rate would be lower. The 
standard gravity model yields a restricted version of (4.15) with 𝑓𝑓 = 0 . The authors use 
nonparametric and semiparametric specifications to estimate (4.15) and show the results are 
similar to when they used OLS with the structural measure of 𝜏𝜏2𝑉𝑉
𝜏𝜏1𝑉𝑉
.  
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
4.31 Effects on China 
Handley and Limão (2017a) use China-US trade data between 2000 and 2005, to estimate 
the effect of 𝜏𝜏2𝑉𝑉 𝜏𝜏1𝑉𝑉⁄  on China’s export growth to the US using a nonparametric approach. 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics on the changes in export across HS-6 industries between 
2000 and 2005. As Table 4.1 shows, Chinese export value averaged 1.28 log points, which 
implies that growth in export is more than two times during the period. At the same time, the 
Chinese export price index decreased by more than 10 percent. The Chinese export variety 
growth averaged .32 log points, that is, variety rose by 37 percentage. Moreover, there is a 
significant difference between high and low sunk-cost industries. The industries’ high 
uncertainty subsample has a much greater growth rate on export value and variety and is lower 
on the price index. The reduction of trade policy uncertainty has a more remarkable impact on 
the high initial uncertainty subsample than low. Additionally, Handley et al. (2014) find that 
the reduction of TPU in intermediate-term production boosts Chinese total productivity growth. 
However, the reduction of TPU for the final product restrains Chinese total productivity growth. 
Although the nonparametric method is theoretically possible with an infinitely large 
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sample, it is difficult to use in practice because the data needs to be sliced into several 
dimensions. As a result, econometricians have focused on semiparametric methods. 
Semiparametric methods combine a parametric component with a nonparametric component, 
avoiding the curse of dimensionality. It is helpful to control for other determinants of dependent 
variables and estimate for specific terms.  
The model in Handley and Limão (2017a) suggest that the parametric measure of 
uncertainty is 1 − (𝜏𝜏2/𝜏𝜏1)−𝜎𝜎 and the tariffs coefficients 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏 and transport cost coefficients 
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 satisfy 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏 =  𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 �
𝜎𝜎
𝜎𝜎−1
�. As explained before, 𝜎𝜎 is the constant elasticity of substitution, 
and it is estimated to be between 3 and 8 in the literature. Handley and Limão (2017a) use 𝜎𝜎 =
3 . The coefficients estimated by OLS in Handley and Limão (2017a) using the parametric 
measure of uncertainty are reported in Table 4.2 below. In addition, given that 𝑓𝑓𝜏𝜏 = −4.25, 
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = −2.833, this confirms that 𝜎𝜎 = 3.  
The coefficient of interest is uncertainty in Table 4.2. The positive coefficient suggests that 
reducing uncertainty leads to an increase in Chinese export growth to the U.S. In addition, one 
standard deviation reduction in uncertainty (0.20) is associated with 14.7 percentage increase 
in Chinese export growth to the US. As predicted, the coefficients on tariffs and transport costs 








Table 4.1 Summary Statistics by Pre-WTO Uncertainty  
 
 Low  High  Total  
Chinese export value growth  1.16*** 1.35*** 1.28*** 
Chinese export price index growth  -.77*** -.14*** -.11*** 
Chinese export variety growth .27*** .35*** 0.32*** 
Observations  1124 2087 3211 
Source: Handley and Limão (2017a) Table 1. 
Notes: low uncertainty refers to bottom tercile of pre -WTO uncertainty; high uncertainty 









Table 4.2 Dependent Variable: Chinese Export Growth 2000-2005 
Uncertainty  .734*** 
 (.154) 
Change in tariff -4.25*** 
 (.677) 
Change in transport cost -2.833*** 
 (.451) 
Sector FE YES 
Source: Handley and Limão (2017a) Table 2.  
Notes: correlation effects are reported. *** indicates significance at the 1 






























Panel A in Table 4.3 provides evidence for the Chinese export growth resulted from a 
reduction in TPU in industries with high sunk costs. There is no significant effect of reducing 
trade policy uncertainty on Chinese export to the US in low-sunk cost industries. However, 
TPU has a significant and positive effect on high-sunk cost industries, as the model predicts. 
As a placebo test, there is no significant effect of reducing TPU on Taiwanese export growth 
in either low- and high-sunk-cost industries (Columns 3 and 4). This is because, unlike China, 
Taiwan did not face temporary MFN status with the U.S. in the 1990s but enjoyed permanent 
normal trade relation with the U.S. (PNTR). Moreover, in panel B of Table 4.3, there is 
significant growth of Chinese exports to the United States in high-sunk cost industries and no 
significant effect in low-sunk cost industries. Reducing TPU between China and the U.S. also 
has no effect on Chinese exports to the European Union (EU). 
 
Table 4.3 US Imports and Chinese Exports Growth, 2000-2005 
US imports from: 
Sunk cost sample: 
China  Taiwan  
Low  High  Low  High  
Panel A: US imports growth ∆𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 








Chinese exports to: 
Sunk cost sample: 
US EU 
Low High  Low  High  
Panel B: China exports growth ∆𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 







Source: Handley and Limão (2017a) Table 3. 
Note: For panel A: The United States imports from China and Taiwan in 2000 and 2005 in the subset of 
HS-6 products. For panel B: China exports to the United States and European Union in 2000 and 2005 in 
the subset of HS-6 products 
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Feng et al. (2017) estimate uncertainty and price data of China-US trade in 2000 -2006 to 
capture accordant conclusions to Handley and Limão (2017a): more reduction in TPU, lower 
Chinese export price. The most contributions of them was on export dynamic process. They 
are the first to point out the simultaneity of entry and exit and confirm that reduction in TPU 
influences resource allocation by encouraging more firms to enter, while fewer incumbents exit. 
They divided firms into three types: incumbents, new entrants, and exiters. They find that after 
the reduction in TPU, firms who exited the export market decreased by 76% while the number 
of new exporters increased by 67%. That because TPU reductions induce more competitive 
firms with higher productivity entry export market, while firms with lower productivity may 
not able to compare with the new export market entrants. Furthermore, TPU reductions 
simulate market competition because reductions encourage new exporters who charge 
relatively lower prices (Feng et al. 2017). They believe new exporters are more productive to 
produce higher quality goods and charge lower prices than exiting exporters. 
Therefore, Feng et al. (2017) confirm a dramatic relocation in fine-product level due to 
China’s WTO accession through TPU reduction. More importantly, they demonstrate lower 
prices and higher quality for the goods produced by new exporters. Largest effects on products 
experienced larger TPU reduction.  
4.32 Effects on the US 
Trade policy uncertainty also impacts the macroeconomic index, such as productivity, the 
employment rate, and public welfare. Specifically, reductions in trade policy uncertainty affects 
not only Chinese export but also US employment. I confirm that the elimination of the 
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probability of sudden tariff hikes encourages Chinese producers to invest in entering or 
upgrading to the US markets. This phenomenon aggravates the competition between Chinese 
exporters and US producers in the US market. Moreover, US producers have the incentive to 
invest more in the China market through building factories in China or establishing 
relationships with Chinese producers. All the phenomena above imply that US producers are 
not willing to pay the same amount of money for less labor in the US than they are in China.  
Pierce and Schott (2016) note that Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in China-
US trade in 2000 reduced not only TPU but also employment rate. Figure 4.2 compares annual 
manufacturing unemployment according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to Real Value 
Added as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis from 1948 to 2010. US manufacturing 
employment drops dramatically after 2000 while the real value added in US manufacturing 
gradually grows during this period, despite a slower rate in 2008. Pierce and Schott (2016) 
think the decline in US manufacturing employment is caused by willingness of US labor-
intensive industries to hire workers that are cheaper in labor-abundant China. 
Difference-in-differences (DID) is typically used to predict the effect of a particular 
treatment by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between the treatment group and 
the control group. Here, this approach removes biases in post-PNTR between the indicator and 
time-varying variables, NTR tariff rates and other controls from permanent differences between 
these groups. Thus, to test the relationship between the enactment of Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (PNTR) between the United States and China, and US manufacturing employment, 
they apply a generalized OLS DID approach. Table 4.4 reports the results of DID regressions. 
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The dependent variable is the log of employment, and the independent variable is an indicator 
of the interaction of the NTR gap and a post-PNTR. 
As indicated in Table 4.4, the results of the first row are negative and significant in all 
three columns, implying that the enactment of PNTR is consistent with the decrease in US 
manufacturing employment. The absolute numbers of these results decrease as more covariates 
are added. The result in the last row of column 3 represents the applied impact of PNTR as 
being associated with -0.151 log points of manufacturing employment. Further, the negative 
and statistically significant coefficient of China import tariffs indicates that a decline of 
Chinese import tariffs coincides with higher US manufacturing employment vice versa for 
positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
To confirm that the lower US manufacturing employment is not because of shocks of 
global manufacturing employment, Pierce and Schott (2016) also compare employment in the 
United States to the European Union (EU) using data from 1998 to 2005. The first row of Table 
4.5 indicates that PNTR is related to lower manufacturing employment in the US versus the 
EU. The second and third columns display DID regressions. Results in these two columns show 
that PNTR is related to statistically significant lower employment in the US but not in the EU. 
Further, they confirmed that lower US manufacturing employment after PNTR is not because 







Table 4.4 Baseline Results (LBD) 
 ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 

















Post × Contract Intensityi   
-0.181 
(0.112) 
Post × ∆ China Import Tariffsi   
-0.244 
(0.140) 
Post × ∆ China Subsidiesi   
0.063 
(0.088) 
MFA Exposureit   
-0.342*** 
(0.060) 
Observations  5700 5700 5700 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 
Fixed effects  i, t i, t i, t 
Employment weighted Yes Yes Yes 
Implied impact of PNTR -0.229 -0.193 -0.151 
Source: Pierce and Schott (2016) Table 1. 
Notes: Dada from 19990 to 2007. The first column only includes the DID term and the 
necessarily fixed effects. The second column includes the terms of the 1st column and the 
initial factor intensities of industries. The third column includes the terms above, China 






Table 4.5 Employment in the United States versus European Union (EU) 
 ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)-EU ln(𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − US 
Post × NTR Gapi,1999 ×  1 -0.641*** 
(-0.247) 
  




Observations  1664 999 832 
R2 0.997 0.994 0.982 
Fixed Effects ct, ci, it i, t i, t 
Employment weighted Yes Yes Yes 




Figure 4.2 US Manufacturing Employment versus Valued Added 
Pierce and Schott (2016) Figure 3. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
A growing amount of theoretical and empirical research claims that the significance of 
trade policy uncertainty cannot be neglected. Early literatures suggest that one motive for 
signing agreements is to offer a stable trade policy environment for firms (Limão, 2016). 
However, this motive had not been presented until the economists, represented by Handley and 
Limão, bring this motive under theoretical analysis within the heterogenous firms’ framework 
(Melitz, 2003) and confirm that TPU is an essential mechanism of the preferential trade 
agreement. A reduction in TPU between two countries accelerates more firm entries into export 
markets and more expenditure on intermediate goods from the foreign country. More 
importantly, the entry and exit of the firms show heterogenous characteristics: a reduction in 
TPU not only causes competitive firms to enter the export market but also leads to exits of 
uncompetitive firms. The reduction in TPU has more effects on high-sunk cost industries. This 
finding has contributed to formulating industrial and trade policies. Furthermore, the reduction 
in TPU also affects the prices and quality of products and promotes production innovation. 
Although academia has formed systematic theoretical research on the reduction in TPU, there 
are still deficiencies that need to be explored. 
First, we need to make an improvement in the insufficient comprehensive measurements 
of TPU. In an increasingly complex international environment, the interaction among tariffs, 
fluctuations in the global economy and domestic policies are also becoming increasingly 
complex. Measuring TPU due to these three factors is crucial. Second, for now, there is little 
literature on an increase in TPU. Several pieces of literatures research a TPU hike just 
according to counterfactual introduction (Handley and Limão 2017a). We realize that 
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understanding the effects of an increase in TPU will be more beneficial and important to face 
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